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Some of the most interesting work currently being done 
in science education research is with scientifically 
misconceived ideas about the causes and mechanisms of 
natural phenomena, or as it is more simply referred to, 
misconception research. This type of research can be 
dated as early as the sixties (see Kuethe, 1963; Boyd, 
1966); but it came into its own with the 1983 and 1987 
international symposia on misconception research in 
science and mathematics education held at Cornell 
University (Helms & Novak). Researchers have 
demonstrated that students do not come into the science 
classroom with minds tabula rasa, but that students 
bring with them ideas and values about the natural 
world that they have formulated on based on their own 
socio-cultural environment or from previous 
educational experiences. As scientifically acceptable 
explanations, some of these ideas are simply inaccurate, 
others are quite close if not essentially correct. Some 
students come into class already holding a high view of 
science. Others come with value systems that will 
readily incorporate a high view of science given the 
proper circumstances. Others are prepared to resist. 
 
 To date, misconception research has been 
limited to elucidating misconceptions in various subject 
areas and upon instructional strategies for replacing 
them with accurate scientific understanding. However, 
the significance of this research is that attention has 
been focused on the epistemology of students, whether 
they are young adults or children. This is in marked 
contrast to Piagetian researchers who, to paraphrase 
Gareth B. Matthews, do not take children's puzzlings 
seriously (1980, p. 48). 
 
 As in any avenue of research, certain 
assumptions are required. Though not stated explicitly, 
it can be inferred from the corpus of misconception 
research that an assumption of homogeneity among 
students is being made, even when there is gender, 
racial, and cultural diversity among students. 
Specifically, it is assumed that students come into 
secondary and college science classes with relatively 
homogeneous, fundamental views of the natural world 
capable of assimilating and valuing modern scientific 
understanding when science knowledge is presented in 
traditional enquiry fashion. When a misconception is 
encountered, an exact identification of the 
misconception is sought, plus methods for supplanting it 
with accurate scientific understanding. Generally it is 
not asked, "Is it possible that this scientifically 
misconceived idea is a logical deduction from some 
fundamental view of nature held by the student?" This 
question indicates that the researcher suspects that more 
is at issue than factors of pedagogy and student 
intelligence. 
 
 Indeed, seeking to know more about students' 
fundamental views of the world, their epistemological 
macrostructures, is a logical extension of 
misconception research. Furthermore, this is an 
extension that should help provide the needed 
theoretical framework for continued misconception 
research, as well as for research regarding gender and 
cultural factors in science education. One perhaps is 
tempted to see epistemological macrostructure as an 
issue only in conjunction with gender and culture, but 
this tendency to assume general homogeneity amongst 
students keeps researchers from a more comprehensive 
under-standing of factors that lead to science 
achievement and positive science attitudes. 
Furthermore, it may be the very assumption that blinds 
researchers to the root causes for the documented 
recalcitrance of misconceptions to standard science 
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pedagogy (Ausubel, 1963; Osborne & Wittrock, 1983). 
 
 There are other researchers interested in 
students' epistemological structures (e.g., Driver, 
Guesne & Tiberghein, 1985, Driver & Easley, 1978; 
Fensham, 1980; Freyberg & Osborne, 1981). Gilbert 
and Swift (1985, p. 682) note that "an emerging 
`invisible college' for what we have termed the 
`alternative conceptions movement' (ACM) appears to 
be gradually emerging." According to Osborne and 
Wittrock 
 
over the last few years there has been a growing 
awareness among science educators of the 
importance, for learning, of the conceptions that 
children of all ages bring with them to science 
lessons (p. 489, 1983). 
They go on to list twelve aspects of physical phenomena 
that have been the topics of research adding that  
 
a most important feature of these studies is the 
attempt to establish the views children hold 
whether or not these views are congruent with 
those of scientists. 
More recently Ault, Novak and Gowin (1988) have 
pursued this line of research using Gowin's Vee Map 
methodology. 
 
 The theoretical work reported in this paper 
differs in that its focus is the epistemological levels 
antecedent to the specific concepts that students hold 
about physical phenomena. From this theoretical point 
of view, each person can be seen as having a 
fundamental, epistemological macrostructure that forms 
the basis for his or her view of reality (or nature). The 
more common term is worldview. The concept of 
worldview has not often been used in science education 
research likely for wont of a theory of worldview that 
can direct analysis. The purpose of this paper is to 
discuss an adaptation of the Kearney logico-structural 
model of worldview as a theoretical framework for 
directing science education research. 
 
 I have not discussed the evidence that supports 
Kearney's theory, because in his book Worldview 
(1984), he has already done that far better than I could. 
The very fact that Kearney's theoretical work is based 
on empirical anthropological research rather than on 
more speculative philosophical analysis gives it a 
credibility lacking in other approaches to worldview 
(e.g., Pepper, 1942). Of course Kearney is not without 
his critics and I would refer the interested reader to 
reviews by Dundes (1984) and Wilk (1985). 
 
 Some critics may point out that worldview 
studies are necessarily influenced by the worldview of 
the researcher. Knowing this to be true Kearney openly 
declares that his worldview is significantly informed by 
Marxist materialism. This influence is clearly seen in 
his writing; however, his worldview model is not 
inherently Marxist. Neither is the model essentially 
materialistic. It becomes so only for those who like 
Kearney view mechanism as not merely a method, but 
as a metaphysic. I reject the Marxist and materialist 
tenets in Kearney's writings, and adapt his worldview 
model as part of a mechanistic method for exploring 
how a student comes to under-stand, value and accept 
the scientific enterprise. In my work the Kearney 
worldview model has to do with epistemology, not 
ontology (see MacKay, 1987). In fact it is my 
expectation that worldview research will help clarify 
the distinction between mechanism as a method 
(epistemology) and mechanism as a metaphysic 
(ontology). 
 
Critical Assumptions 
With respect to the Kearney model of worldview, the 
principal assumption is that all human activity proceeds 
from a cognitive root, even affection. It is also 
important to note that the concept of worldview has no 
common sense counterpart, anymore than do the models 
we call photons or genes. Any worldview model is an 
abstraction derived from certain observed phenomena, 
but is not a picture of those phenomena. 
 
 Most would grant that in ethnically diverse 
classrooms a prima facie case can be made for 
worldview variations as a factor in the education 
process. The principal assumptions in my use of 
worldview theory in science education research are that 
the students in most, if not all, science classrooms have 
subtle, worldview variations; and that these variations 
constitute an important factor in science achievement 
and attitude development among students. This paper 
differs from many others in science education research 
in that I assume that studies in anthropology can be as 
important to science education as have been studies in 
the history and philosophy of science. 
 
 The terminology used in this article is that of the 
cultural anthropologist. For clarity, I use worldview as a 
noun and worldview as an adjective. Related concepts 
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for worldview that occasionally appear in the education 
literature are root metaphor, world hypothesis, view of 
nature, view of reality, and perceptual framework. 
Often these concepts are incorrectly used as synonyms 
for worldview.  
 
Defining the Concept of World View 
Worldview refers to the culturally-dependent, generally 
subconscious, fundamental organization of the mind. 
This organization manifests itself as a set of 
presuppositions or assumptions, which predispose one 
to feel, think, and act in predictable patterns. Kearney 
refers to worldview as:  
 
...culturally organized macrothought: those 
dynamically inter-related basic assumptions of a 
people that determine much of their behavior 
and decision making, as well as organizing much 
of their body of symbolic creations ... and 
ethnophilosophy in general (1984, p. 1).  
To be rational means to think and act with reason, or in 
other words to have an explanation or justification for 
thought and action. Such explanations and justifications 
ultimately rest upon one's worldview, one's 
presuppositions about the world. Or in other words, a 
worldview inclines one to a particular way of thinking. 
According to Kearney a world view:  
 
...consists of basic assumptions and images that 
provide a more or less coherent, though not 
necessarily accurate, way  of thinking about 
the world (1984, p. 41).  
Specifically, a worldview defines the self. It sets the 
boundaries of who and what I am. It also defines 
everything that is not me, including my relationships to 
the human and non-human environments. It shapes my 
view of the universe, my conception of time and of 
space. It influences my norms and values (Kraft, 1978, 
p. 4).  
 Often one thinks of a worldview as religion or 
philosophy, for example the Christian worldview or the 
realist worldview. Religion is indeed an especially 
powerful formative force on the mind of a growing 
child, greatly influencing the contours of a child's 
worldview. But in that there are many other 
environmental factors that influence a child, religion 
and philosophy are also part of the specific content of a 
worldview, thus for example the significant differences 
and similarities between African and Western 
Christians. Hiebert (1976) refers to religion and 
philosophy as the visible expressions of a worldview. 
In Wallace's descriptive prose:  
 
...a worldview is not merely a philosophical 
by-product of each culture, like a shadow, but 
the very skeleton of concrete cognitive 
assumptions on which the flesh of customary 
behavior is hung. Worldview, accordingly, may 
be expressed, more or less systematically, in 
cosmology, philosophy, ethics, religious ritual, 
scientific belief, and so on, but it is implicit in 
almost every act (1970, p. 143).  
 
According to anthropologists a worldview has five 
functions (Kraft, 1974). It explains the how and why of 
things, and why things continue as they do. It validates 
"goals, institutions, and values of a society and provides 
them with a means for evaluating all outside influences 
as well as activities and attitudes within the society" 
(1974, p. 4). A worldview reinforces people "at points 
of anxiety or crisis in life providing security and 
support for the behavior of the group" (1974, p. 5); and 
both encourages and prescribes behavior.  
 
  A worldview is an integrator. It allows one to 
order and systematize sense perceptions. As Kraft 
writes, 
 
This system makes it possible for a people to 
conceptualize what reality should be like and to 
understand and interpret all that happens day by 
day in this framework (1974, p. 5). 
Finally, there is an adaptive function. A worldview is 
"resilient and reconciles differences between the old 
under-standings and the new in order to maintain a state 
of equilibrium" (1974, p. 5). A worldview helps one 
maintain a sense of mental order and balance in a world 
of change via the dialectical interaction between our 
extant worldview assumptions and environmental 
changes.  
 
 Cultural anthropologists study worldviews to 
learn more about people and their cultures. They want 
to know why one group acts and thinks this way, while 
another group acts and thinks a different way. For 
educators the importance of worldview is identified in 
two assumptions:  
 
that the best immediate understanding of 
behavior is offered by understanding the 
thoughts that underlie the behavior, and...other 
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things being equal, the economy of human 
thought and the nature of culture are such that 
cognitive assumptions at work in one area of 
life, say economic production, will also 
organize thinking in others, say ... ideas about 
human nature (Kearney, 1984, pp. 3 and 4). 
In other words we assume that what we think has a great 
influence on our actions; and furthermore, that even very 
different areas of thought are influenced by what might 
be called generic, cognitive assumptions. Knowing 
something about students' worldviews should enable an 
educator to better understand student attitudes, 
achievement and behavior in the classroom. 
 
 To this point I have used two terms when 
referring to the content of a worldview, assumptions 
and presuppositions. Assumption is Kearney's (1984) 
preferred term while presupposition is shortened from 
Collingwood's (1940) absolute presupposition. 
Because it is generally necessary to use the term 
assumption for other purposes, e.g., research 
assumptions in an investigation, I find it less confusing 
to use the term presupposition when referring to 
worldview content. For the sake of brevity I have 
dropped the adjective absolute though I consider 
Collingwood's distinction between absolute and 
relative presuppositions to be an important one. It is a 
distinction that merits further attention, but in another 
paper. 
 
 The Formation of a World View 
 Figure 1 is an attempt to illustrate the theoretical 
relationship that worldview has with cognition, 
learning, perception and behavior, and environment. 
The driving force behind the development of a 
worldview is our need to relate to the outside world. 
As aptly stated by Ross (1962, p. x), man's "experience 
is useless unless interpreted." Therefore, beginning in 
childhood, each person interacts with his or her 
physical and social environment, and through this 
myriad of environmental interactions, worldview 
presuppositions are unconsciously constructed. The 
process occurs over a long period of time, with the 
formative, childhood years being of most importance. 
Through the years of schooling, formal education 
contributes to worldview development; and in turn, a 
worldview provides a foundation upon which cognitive 
frameworks are built during the learning process. 
 
 At some point of maturity (e.g., as an adult) the 
malleableness of a worldview begins to decrease. It 
becomes resilient in the face of change providing an 
adult with cognitive stability. As noted above 
worldviews have an adaptive function, which allows 
even adults to adjust to new environments. Thus, while 
worldview presuppositions are strongly held, they are 
not immutable. The strength with which a mature 
worldview is held appears to be inversely related to the 
degree of heterogeneity in a culture. The more 
heterogeneity, the less strongly a worldview is apt to be 
held. This process of worldview development and 
change is what Kearney calls "dialectical 
constructionism" (1984, p. 3), and it shares much with 
Piaget's genetic epistemology (1971) as well as with 
Ausubel's constructionist theory of learning (Ausubel, 
Novak & Hanesian, 1978). In human mental 
architecture, worldview is the foundation upon which 
cognitive and perceptual frameworks are built. 
 
 At this point it is essential to recognize the 
difference between a lived worldview and an 
articulated worldview, terms coined by philosopher 
John Kok (1988). Lived worldview refers to the same 
concept of worldview defined above. It conveys the 
sense that a worldview is a communally shared, 
epistemological framework essential for daily life. This 
idea dates to the late 1800's and Wilhelm Dilthey who 
coined the term Weltbild or world picture. He argued 
that one's Weltbild developed in the context of one's 
Lebenswelt, i.e., the world in which one lives, 
presumably by a process similar to that described in 
this section. Dilthey however, further theorized that on 
the foundation of one's Weltbild, a person may go on to 
construct a Weltanschauung or articulated worldview 
(Holmes, 1983). Quite opposite of a lived worldview, 
an articulated worldview is formed in a process that is 
"conscious, coherent [and] unambiguous" (Kok, 1988, 
p. 20). Plato's dialogues, Aristotle's treatises, Calvin's 
Institutes each sets forth an articulated world view. Of 
more central interest here is the notion of a scientific 
worldview, which in its common usage refers to an 
articulated worldview. In this article the term 
worldview always refers to a lived worldview because 
a lived worldview is considered to be antecedent to any 
articulated worldview. An articulated worldview must 
be considered part of the cognitive and perceptual 
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framework depicted in Figure 1, though in reality the 
distinction between the two is often obscured. An 
elucidation of the dialectical relationship between these 
two levels of worldview will be an important issue in 
science education research, though not an simple one. 
These two aspects of worldview were the cause of 
heated discussion among anthropologists at the 1968 
Wenner-Gren Conference on Worldviews at which no 
resolution was reached (Jones, 1972). 
 
The Concept of a Scientific World View 
When thinking about worldviews we usually do not 
think about individuals. The concept of worldview is 
most often associated with civilizations, religions, and 
eras (see Quigley, 1979). One speaks of a Western 
worldview, an Eastern worldview, medieval 
worldview, or scientific worldview. 
 
 What is call the modern scientific worldview is 
a uniquely Western phenomenon born out of the 
intellectual tumult of the 16th to 18th Centuries in 
Europe. With the rise of Newtonianism a mechanistic 
worldview triumphed amongst the literati over its 
competitors, the Aristotelian, "world as an organism" 
view, and the Neo-Platonic, "mysterious universe" view 
(Kearney, 1971). The triumphant mechanistic view 
exemplified by the philosophical arguments of Rene 
Descartes and the experimental work of Newton and 
Boyle became the basis of modern science. It is a 
reductionistic view that sees the explanation of the 
whole in the parts, where machine-type analogies are 
considered appropriate for explaining natural 
phenomena. And though modern physics is modifying 
the classical scientific worldview, it remains a 
thoroughly empirical view that stresses the importance 
of testable hypotheses concerning natural causes. In 
modern America, a primary goal in science education is 
the development of a scientific worldview, especially 
with regard to scientific ways of thinking.  
 
 Since its birth the phenomenon of modern 
science and its attendant worldview have slowly spread 
beyond European borders. In 1967, George Basalla 
presented a three-stage model that describes this 
expansion and growth of science in nonscientific 
societies. In a new area, science is at first dependent 
upon older science and scientists. For example 
American science was for many years dependent upon 
European science. Basalla suggested that for the new 
science to become independent, seven tasks needed to 
be completed. The first task and the one most pertinent 
to the subject of worldview is that a 
 
 resistance to science on the basis of 
philosophical and religious beliefs must be 
overcome and replaced by positive 
encouragement of scientific research (p. 617). 
 
Understanding that philosophical and religious beliefs 
are an important part of the content of a worldview, we 
may conclude that the emergence of an independent 
science requires a scientifically compatible worldview. 
The people of nonscientific, nontechnological societies 
often have worldviews that are incompatible with 
scientific thinking. It is not that they are nonrational 
(Horton, 1967), but that their rationality based on a 
different worldview results in a nonscientific way of 
thinking. For such a society to develop an independent 
science, the worldview of a significant portion of its 
people must change.  
 
 Figure 2 graphically represents worldviews in 
scientific and non-scientific societies. As examples we 
may take respectively the United States and a 
non-Western, developing nation (assume equal 
population sizes). The X-axis represents a hypothetical 
scale of worldview compatibility with scientific 
thinking. The Y-axis represents the hypothetical 
frequencies of the scientifically compatible worldviews 
in the two example nations. At first one might think that 
the worldview frequency distribution for a scientific 
society such as the United States should be drawn with 
less variation. However, the United States is a 
pluralistic nation, and is becoming more so. For 
example, there is a high school in Houston that is 
reported to have 87 nationalities represented in its 
student body (Wilson, 1988).  
 
 It is likely that the historic American subcultures 
of African-Americans, Native American Indians, and 
women contribute to the variability depicted in Figure 2 
since all are under-represented among science students 
and in science-related occupations (Behringer, 1985; 
Haukoos, 1986; Hueftle, Rakow & Welch, 1983; 
Malcom, George & Matyas, 1985; Vetter & Babco, 
1988). Other sub-cultures have been transplanted from 
nonscientific societies. Furthermore, throughout the 
whole of American society there is significant interest 
in decidedly unscientific practices such as astrology, to 
wit Mrs. Reagan. Taken together, this suggests 
worldview variation even within what is normally 
considered a scientific society.
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 Figure 2 helps us to see that a primary task 
among developing nations is shifting the distribution of 
worldview variations sufficiently toward scientific 
compatibility so that the society can sustain independent 
science (Dart, 1971). For the United States the task is 
much different. Given the basic science education goal 
of developing within students a scientific worldview, 
many would argue that the American education task is to 
move the distribution center further to the right, while 
simultaneously reducing heterogeneity. This 
presupposes that the current, dominant scientific 
worldview is the best one for supporting the scientific 
enterprise. Others disagree and seek through education 
the reconstruction of the scientific worldview in 
different modes, e.g., a feminist mode (Coughlin, 1984; 
Harding, 1986; Levin, 1988).  
 
 Another view of the American task presupposes 
nothing about the current, dominant scientific 
worldview. Instead, the task is to build bridges between 
the enterprise of science and the worldview variations 
within the populace. This is the position taken in this 
paper.  
 
Worldview in the Science Education Literature  
To date worldview is something only occasionally 
referred to in the education literature. Anderson (1988) 
recently has used worldview in a discussion of 
cognitive styles and multicultural populations, 
specifically referring to non-Western and Western 
worldviews. Duschl (1988) used the term in a 
discussion of the problem of scientism in science 
education. 
 
 Brent Kilbourn (1974) pioneered the use of this 
concept in empirical science education research. Noting 
Robert's comment that "virtually every science teaching 
program tries to get youngsters to adopt a scientific 
way-to-explain" (1972, p. 1), Kilbourn proceeded to 
analyze secondary, biology textbooks for implicit 
projections of worldviews. With the exception of 
Kilbourn's 1984 article in which he summarizes his 
earlier work and a 1988 paper by Proper, Wideen and 
Ivany, there has been no further empirical education 
research where worldview is involved as a key 
construct. Kilbourn hints at the reason for this lack of 
research activity when he talks about the tremendous 
complexity of worldviews (1984, p. 36). Others agree. 
From the literature of anthropology and philosophy, 
Jones (1972) lists thirteen different synonyms for 
worldview, commenting that,  
 
 Critics suspect that a concept so variously 
named is itself somewhat vague, and this 
suspicion doubtless explains why some students 
of culture prefer to ignore the notion of 
worldview altogether...(p. 79). 
 
The vagueness of these terms is such that we have done 
little more than name a hypothetical entity, and this 
doubtless explains the limited use of worldview in 
education research. 
 
 Kilbourn based his research on Pepper's 
philosophical treatment of worldview published in a 
book titled World Hypotheses (1942). Pepper identified 
six hypotheses that are metaphors for the ways in which 
people explain things. They are metaphors for causality. 
Kilbourn and researchers after him have equated these 
metaphors with worldview, though Pepper does not use 
this term himself. Thus, Kilbourn concluded that most 
biology textbooks project a mechanistic worldview 
based on his observation that Pepper's root metaphor 
mechanism most closely matched the majority of 
explanations given in the textbooks examined. 
 
 The difficulty with doing research based on a 
concept of worldview derived from Pepper's work is 
that the above mentioned ambiguity is not appreciably 
reduced. This can amply be seen in the Proper, Wideen 
and Ivany study (1988), a study that purportedly 
analyzed the worldviews science teachers projected in 
their classrooms. They found that an individual teacher 
will at times use explanations corresponding to more 
than one of Pepper's root metaphors (p. 554); and 
concluded that an individual teacher at times projects 
different worldviews. The observation is not surprising, 
but it makes little sense to claim that a teacher's 
worldview, that is, the teacher's culturally-dependent, 
generally subconscious, fundamental organization of the 
mind changes from time to time during the class. These 
researchers cannot be using the term worldview as it 
has been historically understood. The problem lies with 
Pepper's root metaphor theory. Pepper's theory is about 
causality; and though causality is an important part of a 
worldview, the two are not one and the same. Later in 
this paper an alternate interpretation of the Proper, 
Wideen and Ivany data will be offered. 
 The principal value of the Kilbourn and the 
Proper, Wideen and Ivany studies is that they raise 
important epistemological questions. However, since 
they suffer from semantic confusion the further use of 
worldview in education research requires a theory of 
worldview that more articulately, more operationally 
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defines this fundamental, cognitive macrostructure with 
all of its possible variations. For this one must look to 
the literature of cultural anthropology. 
 
Worldview and Cultural Anthropology 
Worldview is a term more familiar to cultural 
anthropologists than to educators, yet even for 
anthropologists the lack of an adequate theory of 
worldview has been a problem. Kearney (1984) writes:  
 
Although worldview is one of the central 
subjects of American cultural anthropology, 
there is surprisingly little theoretical literature 
concerning it... (p. 1). Although worldview is a 
subject of immense importance in the social 
sciences and philosophy, a coherent theory of 
worldview is nonexistent (p. 9). This lack of a 
conceptual framework has been one of the main 
obstacles to the study of particular worldviews 
and their cross-cultural assessment (p. 1).  
 
Kearney's research is a response to this problem. He 
has attempted to provide a theory, which defines a 
worldview construct with sufficient articulation so that 
it can be used in the cross-cultural study and assessment 
of worldviews. It is my contention that there exists in 
American society significant worldview variation and 
that this variation influences the process of education, 
particularly science education. Therefore, Kearney's 
worldview theory has important implications for 
educational research as well. 
 
 Kearney begins with a historical review of the 
concept of worldview. He notes that the general 
paradigm used by American anthropologists doing 
worldview research has been that of theme. This 
monothematic, configurationalist approach is an 
 
 attempt to discover and describe the underlying 
`pattern,' `configuration,' `basic personality,' 
`ethos,' or `world view' of a society. What all of 
these concepts have in common is that they refer 
to an hypothesized mental principle that 
organizes in a distinctive way nonmaterial 
elements...of a given society. These mental 
constructs are assumed to shape social and 
cultural behavior and the material and 
nonmaterial results of this behavior" (Kearney, 
1984, p. 23). 
 
 Cultural anthropologists' attempts to identify 
underlying cultural themes fall into two traditions, one 
built upon the work of Franz Boas (1911) and the other 
Robert Redfield (1941,52). The Boasian tradition 
includes such anthropologists as Ruth Benedict (1934) 
and Margaret Mead (1928). We may take Benedict's 
Patterns of Culture as typical of this tradition. She felt 
that by careful analysis one could find in each culture a 
single psychological theme that fundamentally orders 
each culture's worldview, a premise heavily influenced 
by Gestalt psychology. Pepper's (1942) root metaphor 
theory also falls within the Boasian tradition.  
 
 Redfield, whose work forms the basis for the 
second tradition, also used Benedict's total culture 
approach to worldview research. However in contrast, 
he considered the search for a single, overarching theme 
that would describe a culture to be an oversimplified 
approach. His solution was to look at a culture's 
worldview as a composite of worldview universals 
(Kearney's terminology). With this very important 
advance in worldview research, he maintained the total 
culture concept while interjecting a way to recognize 
and study variation within the culture. His principal 
universals are the unitary Self and the tripartite Other, 
composed of Human, Nature, and God. According to 
Kearney:  
 
Redfield's concept of worldview is mainly 
descriptive. Insofar as he speculated on the 
causes for differing worldviews he did so very 
generally...he did not attempt to explain why a 
certain type of society may have one world 
view, nor how worldviews change. Nor did he 
attempt to explain what connection there is 
between worldview, environment, and behavior 
(1984, pp. 38 and 39).  
 
Michael Kearney's work is in the Redfield tradition, but 
his contribution to worldview research is an articulated 
model of worldview that moves worldview research 
beyond the level of description to the level of analysis. 
 
The Kearney Worldview Model 
 The Kearney model begins with the idea that a 
worldview is an organized set of fundamental, cognitive 
presuppositions about reality. He assumes that this 
organization is shaped by the,  
 
 
... internal equilibrium dynamics among [the 
worldview assumptions]. This means that some 
of these assumptions and resultant ideas, beliefs, 
and actions predicated on them are    logically 
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and structurally more compatible than others, 
and that the entire world view will `strive' 
toward maximum logical and structural 
consistency. The second and main force giving 
coherence and shape to a worldview is the 
necessity of having to relate to the external 
environment (p. 52).  
 
In other words, a worldview tends to be internally 
consistent, in that presuppositions are logically 
integrated and universals are structurally integrated; 
hence, the model is termed logico-structural. A 
worldview is externally valid in that the human need to 
relate to the external environment fosters coherence.  
 
 Kearney's ideas are similar to Redfield's in that 
he suggests that all worldviews are a structural 
composite of seven, basic cognitive categories or 
universals: Self, Other, Relationship, Classification, 
Causality, Space, and Time. These universals he likens 
to the diagnostic categories used by physicians:  
 
 Although the doctor is confronted with a variety 
of  patients, he can presumably describe the 
most significant medical facts about them in 
terms of...features common to all patients, e.g., 
blood pressure, pulse, respiration" (p. 65).  
 In principle groups of people and even 
individuals can be identified by worldview variations, 
which result from the content variation in worldview 
universals. Logically consistent presuppositions about 
reality are the content. Each universal is composed of a 
hierarchically arranged set (or sets) of assumptions, or 
presuppositions, at the end of which is a final absolute 
presupposition or first order presupposition, an ultimate 
presupposition beyond which there are no others. One 
might think of a 1st order presupposition as akin to 
Aristotle's final cause. At the opposite end, these 
hierarchies blend into the cognitive frameworks with 
which educators are more familiar. 
 
 Collingwood provides an amusing story in 
which both ends of a hierarchy are apparent: 
 
.... if you were talking to a pathologist about a 
certain disease and asked him `What is the cause 
of the event E which you say sometimes happens 
in this disease?' he will reply `The cause of E is 
C'; and if he were in a communicative mood he 
might go on to say `That was established by 
So-and-so, in a piece of research that is   now 
regarded as classical.' You might go on to ask: `I 
suppose before So-and-so found out what the 
cause of E was, he was quite sure it had a 
cause?' the answer would be `Quite sure, of 
course.' If you say, `Why?' he will probably 
answer `Because everything that happens has a 
cause.' If you are importunate enough to ask `But 
how do you know that everything that happens 
has a cause?' he will probably blow up in your 
face, because you have put your finger on one of 
his absolute presuppositions...But if he keeps his 
temper and gives you a civil and candid answer, 
it will be to the following effect. `That is a thing 
we take for granted in my job. We don't question 
it' (1940, pp. 31 and 32).  
 
At one end of the pathologist's mental framework is his 
knowledge of diseases and scientific research. At the 
other is a first order presupposition (Collingwood's 
absolute presupposition) in the worldview universal, 
Causality.  
 
 At this point one may wish to ask how 
worldview and belief may, if at all, be distinguished. 
Beliefs seemed to be implied in the terms  Christian 
worldview, Islamic worldview, or secular worldview. 
Ketner (1972) in his dissertation An Essay on the 
Nature of Worldviews argues that the basic worldview 
concepts are in fact fundamental beliefs. Kearney 
rejects this position citing Needham's (1972) contention 
that belief itself is "a concept particular to the Western 
world" (1984, p. 51). The arguments are rather esoteric 
and I do not believe that they are significant for research 
in education. I would only add that there is a range of 
consciousness with regard to worldview 
presuppositions, and the less conscious one is of 
worldview presuppositions, the less belief-like and 
more objective one's worldview presuppositions 
appear. Collingwood's pathologist would no doubt 
consider his causality presupposition to be something 
much more certain than mere belief for which he would 
admit doubt. 
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Two 1st Order Universals 
Universe (or cosmos) is the English language term for 
ultimate inclusiveness. Within the universe an 
individual's primary point of reference is himself or 
herself, i.e., the Self. The functioning of any human 
society is dependent upon self-identification and 
culturally determined notions of the nature of self 
(Hallowell, 1955). Every self (or a person's sense of 
self) exists and interacts within an environment, i.e., the 
Other. Thus the ultimate inclusiveness is composed of 
the Self and all that is not the Self, i.e., the Other. These 
two are the 1st order universals and together form the 
principal axis of a worldview (Kearney, 1984, pp. 
68-70). This axis can be seen in Figure 3, which is 
Kearney's diagrammatic summary of his model. 
 
 The adjectives 1st, 2nd, and 3rd order are my 
own, not Kearney's. I have added them because I find 
that they help to clarify the organization of three sets of  
universals. For the same reason from this point on I also 
have substituted the term NonSelf for Kearney's term 
The Other. 
 
 The nature of Self varies between two polar 
extremes. At one pole are the individuals whose Self is 
continuous with the cosmos. These individuals identify 
themselves with the NonSelf. The distinction between 
Self and NonSelf is minimal. In a sense, all is Self. At 
the other pole nothing is Self. For these individuals the 
Self has become so depersonalized that they feel they 
have ceased to exist. In American society we call 
individuals at the first pole, mystics; and at the second 
pole, psychotics. Piaget has argued that from birth 
normal cognitive development is based on the gradual, 
progressive elaboration of a distinction between Self 
and NonSelf (Piaget, 1969).
 
Figure 3. Kearney’s Logico-Structural Model of Worldview 
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  As stated above, the NonSelf is everything in 
the Universe except the Self, and can be divided into 
domains of equivalent, nonequivalent, or hierarchical 
taxonomic status. The simplest division is into domains 
of human environment and physical environment, or 
society and nature (see Figure 4). For most people 
however, Redfield's tripartite division is more 
appropriate: Society, Nature, and the Supernatural (or 
God). Some of the bitterest controversies in American 
public education can be traced to these differences in 
the Self-NonSelf axis.  
 
 
Figure 4. Examples of Classifications within the 
NonSelf 
 
 NonSelf   NonSelf 
Self ßà 
Society 
 
Nature 
Or Self ßà 
Society 
Nature 
God 
 
 
Three 2nd Order Universals 
One's sense of Self and NonSelf is dependent upon the 
interactions between Self and NonSelf. They are 
structurally integrated, thus, the first 2nd order universal 
in the Kearney model is Relationship, i.e., the 
relationship between the Self and NonSelf. For 
example, a child raised in a warm, secure home can be 
expected to develop a confident sense of self and come 
to know the world (i.e., the NonSelf) to be orderly and 
nonthreatening; whereas an abused child likely grows 
up with low self-esteem. Or, a child raised in an 
environment of unexpected trauma may come to see 
himself as a powerless being living in an unpredictable 
world.  
 
 Fundamentally the relationship between the Self 
and NonSelf can be one of harmony, subordinance, or 
dominance. In actuality there is likely to be mixing. For 
example, the Self-NonSelf relationship with regard to 
the individual and society may be one of harmony, 
while the individual-nature relationship one of 
dominance (Kearney, 1984, pp. 72-78). Historically, a 
relation-ship of dominance derived from the Genesis 
account of creation was crucial to the development of 
experimental science (Hooykaas 1972, Glover 1984). 
The dominance theme continues to be important in 
science, though not without problems (White, 1967; 
Young, 1974). It is implicit in locus of control research 
conducted by science educators that a dominant 
relationship between Self and NonSelf is better than a 
relationship of subordinance (Brooks and Hounshell, 
1975; Scharmann, 1988). 
 
 The Self-NonSelf split is the most obvious case 
of Classification, the next 2nd order universal. Kearney 
writes:  
 Within a cognitively differentiated universe the 
most fundamental classification categories are 
Self and the Other; this is the reason they are 
treated as universal (1984, p. 80). 
After the Self-NonSelf classification, come 
classifications within the NonSelf domain. Figure 4 
shows two Classification methods for the NonSelf, but 
there are many. A third possibility is the pantheistic 
fusion of God and Nature as found in classical Greek 
thought and some Eastern religions. Yet another 
Classification of the NonSelf is between the real and 
unreal. Figure 5 represents the NonSelf domains for a 
theist and atheist. In this example "real" and "unreal" 
are attributes of the various domains into which the 
NonSelf is classified, but not domains themselves. For 
the theist some of the content of the supernatural domain 
is real, but for the atheist, the entire domain is unreal. 
Kearney rightly points out that one must know the 
attributes of a NonSelf-domain as well as the content:  
 
  it is possible that two people may conceptually 
group ...ghosts, spirits, the Devil. Knowing this 
grouping alone tells us little about their 
respective worldviews. However, if we know 
that for one person these items are grouped 
together as elements of folk tales and 
superstitions, while for another sources of 
sickness and sin, we gain insight into the 
associated dimensions of Causality and 
Relationship in their respective worldviews 
(1984, p. 82). 
 
We could easily replace Kearney's anthropology 
example with ones drawn from a high school science 
classroom. There may well be times when a science 
teacher and a student conceptually group nuclei, atoms, 
and molecules. The attribute for the teacher is 
submicroscopic reality, while for some students it is 
simple unreality. For one it may be significance, while 
for the other it is insignificance. The science teacher 
and the student are each using classification categories 
that reflect his or her attitudes and presuppositions 
about the nature of reality.  
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Figure 5. The Attributes: Real and Unreal 
 
NonSelf Domains Real Unreal 
Supernatural God Ghosts Theist 
Nature People Dreams 
 
 
 
NonSelf Domains Real Unreal 
Atheist 
Supernatural People God 
 
 
 Kearney develops his notion of Causality, the 
third 2nd order worldview universal, from a Piagetian 
perspective (1984, pp. 84-89). Because of that and 
because causality is a prominent feature in science 
education, the worldview universal Causality is more 
readily understandable to educators. Kearney employs 
Durkheim's definition of causality:  
 
The first thing which is implied in the notion of 
the causal relationship is the idea of efficacy, of 
productive power, of active force. By cause we 
ordinarily mean something  capable of 
producing a certain change. The cause is the 
force before it has shown the power which is in 
it; the effect is this same power, only actualized 
(Durkheim 1965, p. 406).  
 
 Kearney believes that an individual constructs 
his or her worldview based on the dialectical forces in 
one's life, that is between Self and NonSelf, especially 
during formative childhood years. Therefore he 
incorporates in his theory Piagetian stages of 
development where the nature of cause and effect 
changes for a child with his or her growth and 
experience. Following Piaget (1969), Kearney sees the 
Causality universal developing through periods of 
participation, animism, artificialism, finalism, and 
force.  
 
...in feelings of `participation,' there is an 
assumed affinity of Self with external 
objects...closely allied with this is the notion of 
`animism,' which endows things with 
consciousness and life. In the third form, 
`artificialism,' there is the uncritical assumption 
that objects obey will and intention, and in doing 
so are organized and act for the good of 
men...that things exist for and are organized for 
man is the `finalistic' assumption. To the extent 
that this notion exists, the world is seen as 
teleological. The   fifth type of adherence is the 
notion of `force' or `power,' which is attributed 
to things such that they make efforts as do 
muscles (1984, p. 87). 
 
 According to Piaget, mental development 
involves the gradual development of a mechanical view 
of causality in conjunction with the gradual elimination 
of these five notions, although adherences often continue 
into adulthood. The extent of the adherence is a function 
of an individual's ability to completely distinguish 
between Self and NonSelf, i.e., "dividing off the 
internal world from the external" (Piaget 1969, p. 246). 
 
 Kearney accepts Piaget's dialectical view of 
mental development and use of mental stages, and 
employs Piaget's adherences as aspects of the Causality 
universal useful for describing and comparing 
worldviews. However, he rejects Piaget's conclusions 
as being culturally determined (also see Buck-Morss, 
1975; Cole & Scribner, 1974; Dasen, 1974). Piaget's 
French Swiss children developed mechanical 
viewpoints precisely because they were French Swiss, 
and not for example, Nuer or Hausa. Taking mechanical 
causality as the hallmark of advanced mental 
development would doom the majority of the world to 
mental underdevelopment. Robin Horton's paper 
"African Traditional Thought and Western Science" 
(1967) provides a powerful example of complex, 
formal thought in traditional people in contrast to 
Western, scientific thinking. He effectively blunts the 
ethnocentric view of mental development characteristic 
of many Westerners. 
 
 For a decade science education research has 
been dominated by Piaget's concepts of concrete and 
formal thought, and the development of cognitive 
processes from concrete to formal. However, the 
misconception researcher is interested in students' 
alternative explanations of natural phenomena, and thus 
inherent in misconception research is a change of focus 
from the concept of concrete/formal thinking to the 
concept of adherences. The next step is to investigate 
the epistemological frameworks that make the 
adherences more intelligible and certainly less 
pejorative. 
 
 At this point understanding that causality is only 
one part of a worldview, it is instructive to return to 
Pepper's root metaphor theory and its use in the Proper, 
Wideen and Ivany study (1988). Proper, Wideen and 
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Ivany found that their biology teachers used 
explanations representing four root metaphor 
categories: formism, mechanism, contextualism, and 
organicism. For example, when the subject was 
classification the tendency was for the teachers to use 
formal explanations, but mechanical explanations with 
genetics and cell biology (p. 554). 
 
 Such observations are predictable using the 
logico-structural model of worldview where there is an 
articulation between Self, Causality and NonSelf. As 
one would expect, the world (NonSelf) for these 
teachers is composed of many categories. At some 
appropriate level a categorical distinction in the 
teachers' epistemological framework is made between 
multicellular organisms and individual cells, including 
important cellular molecules. The biology teachers' 
multicellular category is likely to be further divided 
according to similarities and differences among 
organisms, in other words, according to a standard 
phylogenetic taxonomy. In this case the articulation 
between Causality and NonSelf is that structural 
features determine classification, thus the formism 
detected in the classroom when the subject is something 
like phylogeny. 
 
Similarly, at the cellular level the biologist uses many 
more concepts from physical science where mechanical 
explanations predominate. In this case the articulation 
between Causality and NonSelf is that phenomena at the 
cellular level have mechanical causes, thus the 
mechanism detected in the classroom when the subject 
is something like genetics. Clearly, the teachers in the 
Proper, Wideen and Ivany study do not have variable 
worldviews. What they have is a variable concept of 
causality that is rationally related to the their 
understanding of the world. The root metaphor theory 
does not allow one to readily see this distinction. 
 
Two 3rd Order Universals 
The 3rd order universals are Space and Time. There are 
many examples of how people view space differently. 
Ideas about space are a common difference between 
urban and rural dwellers. Unlike his rural cousin, a 
person who lives in the city often has little practical 
awareness of the compass directions east, west, south, 
and north. For the city dweller, direction is generally a 
matter of uptown, downtown, left and right. On the other 
hand, a walk of a short distance for the rural dweller is 
likely to translate to a much longer distance for the 
urban dweller who is accustomed to more compact 
space. In the science classroom, spatial distances often 
are very large or exceedingly small. In either case it is 
not the space common to the every day experiences of 
most children; thus an important aspect of science 
education for young children is the enrichment of their 
notions about space. 
 
 Time, the second 3rd order universal, is a more 
complicated structure. Within a worldview Time can 
have one of three basic orientations, past, present, or 
future, each of which is a different first-order 
presupposition. Historically there has been a strong 
future orientation among white Americans, in part 
traceable to Puritan and Calvinistic influences in 
Colonial America. Success in American education 
generally requires such an orientation. Kearney notes 
that a future orientation is "compatible with scholastic 
achievement in that such a student is more able to resist 
immediate distractions and focus energies 
toward...good grades, degrees, etc." (1984, p. 95). 
 
 Kluckhohn and Strodbeck (1961) note that 
Spanish-Americans are much more present-oriented, in 
contrast to the future-orientation of many Anglos. The 
here and now is more real than anything that may happen 
tomorrow. The stereotype of the unreliable Latino can 
be traced to this very different cognition of time. A 
worldview Time universal can also be past-oriented. 
Kluckhohn and Strodbeck note that this is the case with 
both the Chinese and Mormons. Time oriented to the 
past is manifested in ancestor worship by the Chinese 
and the Mormon interest in genealogies "by which they 
attempt to discover spiritual links with unknown 
ancestors" (Kearney 1984, p. 97).  
 
 In addition to orientations of time, there are 
different images of time. Some people have an 
oscillating image of time where time either runs in 
circles or zig-zags. According to Kearney:  
 
The essential feature of this image of time is that 
time is seen as rhythmically swinging back and 
forth between recurrent markers. Such an image 
occurs most strongly in technologically simple 
preliterate societies (1984, p. 99).  
Alternatively, the image of time can be linear, like a 
timeline that a history teacher might use. Time moves 
from the past into the present and on into the future, 
one-way and irreversible. And since time that has past 
cannot be recovered, and the present also will soon be 
gone, it behooves one to look to time yet to come. In 
other words "a linear image of time is structurally 
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compatible with a future orientation" (Kearney 1984, p. 
101). The co-occurrence of these first order 
presuppositions is common in the West, and can be 
traced back through the Judeo-Christian tradition to the 
early Hebrews. In Genesis there is a specific creation 
event from which time starts. It proceeds through Jewish 
history looking toward the coming of Messiah. The 
Christian tradition adopted the Jewish sense of history, 
except that for Christians time points toward the second 
coming of Messiah and the culmination of all time 
(Glover, 1984). These first order presuppositions in the 
Time universal formed an important distinction between 
the Medieval worldview and the worldview of 
Classical Greece and Rome; and were crucial for the 
development of modern science in Europe (see Foster, 
1934; Klaaren, 1977). 
 
 In addition to the orientation and image 
presuppositions in the Time universal, there are 
important attributes (Kearney, 1984, pp. 102-106). 
Time can vary in depth or range. For example, the future 
can be a few months, a few years, a few decades, or far 
more. One likely consequence is that short-range 
planning is preferred by those who have shorter futures. 
Another attribute is pace. For some people time walks; 
for others, it runs. If it runs, there is a greater need for 
the precise measurement of time. Furthermore, faster 
time generally occurs in a worldview along with linear 
and future-oriented time.  
 
 I have already mentioned that a future 
orientation serves a student well. I conclude this 
discussion of time by noting that in the science 
classroom, time has further importance. The methods of 
science are such that time has a very specific meaning 
and is used with great precision. One can easily see 
how a student's non-scientifically compatible notion of 
time would be challenged in a science classroom. For 
some students, that challenge may result in confusion or 
even render meaningless many aspects of science.  
 
 At this point one might suggest that the 
universals Space and Time are actually no more than 
attributes of the NonSelf. Certainly, Space and Time are 
always thought of in conjunction with some aspect of the 
NonSelf. However, unlike the attribute real/unreal, 
some fundamental form of space/time cognition is 
common to all people (Kearney, 1984, pp. 89-92). Note 
that in Figure 3, Causality is bracketed by the universal 
Relationship on one side, and Time and Space on the 
other. Our understanding of Causality is dependent upon 
both the relationship between the Self and NonSelf, and 
upon our understanding of Space and Time. These four 
universals are intimately related. Only with some notion 
of space and time, plus some notion of how we relate to 
the external world, does a sense of Causality become 
conceivable (1984, pp. 89-107). 
 
 I stated earlier that the primary difficulty with 
the Boasian and Redfield worldview traditions was 
oversimplification. Their approaches do not facilitate 
analytical research, but are used primarily for 
description. Even at that, the configurationalist 
approach to worldview glosses over many differences. 
There is some truth in the statement that the Western 
worldview is mechanistic, but there are many degrees 
of mechanism and many interactions with other factors. 
Kearney's theoretical model with its seven interacting 
universals, provides the analytical tool for studying 
worldview at the individual level and for studying 
subtle worldview variations, without sacrificing the 
ability to draw broad generalizations about worldview 
in a society. If we see similarities in the Causality 
universal then we may agree with Pepper that the West 
has a mechanistic orientation. However, the logico-
structural model with its six other universals keeps one 
from glossing over substantial intra-worldview 
variation. 
 
Scientifically Compatible Worldviews 
At this point I would like to suggest that speaking of a 
scientific worldview is to make a configurationalist 
statement that really does not tell us much. Nor do we 
say much more by substituting mechanical for scientific. 
We still have a monolithic view that glosses over 
substantial differences, such as the differences between 
the scientists B. F. Skinner and Fritjof Capra. With 
Kearney's worldview model one can develop a more 
detailed, and thus more accurate, picture of a 
scientifically compatible worldview that can 
accommodate the occurrence of such different scientists 
as Skinner and Capra.  
 
  If we take Kearney's position that worldviews 
are composed of seven integrated universals, it readily 
becomes apparent that there can be many worldviews 
and even more worldview variations, of which many 
will be scientifically compatible. Consider an 
American scientist and an Indian scientist. While we 
may be tempted to say that they both have the scientific 
worldview, in fact their worldviews will be quite 
different (at both lived and articulated levels). This is 
illustrated by the two frequency graphs in Figures 6a 
and 6b. Let us assume that there are worldview 
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presuppositions and attributes pertinent to science. 
Figure 6a is a hypothetical frequency distribution of 
Indians and Americans on a hypothetical measure of 
these pertinent presuppositions and attributes. Our 
scientists would appear far to the right indicating the 
presence of these science-related presuppositions and 
attributes. By this indicator the two scientists are 
similar and many would say they have a scientific 
worldview.  
 Now consider Figure 6-b, which is a 
hypothetical frequency distribution of Americans and 
Indians on a hypothetical measure of Eastern 
presuppositions and attributes. The American scientist 
would fall on the left along with most Americans, 
scientist or not. While elements of his worldview may 
be similar to elements of an Indian worldview, overall 
he is a Westerner. The Indian scientist however, will 
fall to the right reflecting his Indian background. It may 
well be that his scientific training has changed some of 
his Indian presuppositions. To the extent that this has 
happened, he would fall more to the middle of Figure 
6-b; but a significant difference would still remain 
between the two scientists.  
 
Figure 6a 
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Figure 6b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Therefore, according to Kearney's model we 
should not expect one, single scientific worldview. 
There will be content within the seven, worldview 
universals that is fairly constant within a group of 
people considered to have a scientific worldview. This 
is content pertinent to the enterprise of science. There 
will also be content differences. Depending on a 
person's background those differences may be rather 
large, as would be likely between Indian and American 
scientists, or rather small, as would be likely between 
two American scientists. The distinction between 
worldview and worldview variation or variant of a 
worldview may be likened to the distinction between 
language and dialect. Thus for our two scientists it 
probably would be more accurate to say that one has a 
scientifically compatible variant of an American 
worldview, while the other has a scientifically 
compatible variant of an Indian world view. 
 
 That the differences between any two American 
scientists are small is a result, first, of being born and 
raised in America. Second, the two probably will be 
white males from middle class backgrounds. 
Furthermore, they also will have had their 
science-inclinations developed through years of similar 
schooling experiences. However, the worldview 
variations among all high school and college students 
will be much greater. Major variations are likely to 
stem from racial, ethnic, gender, and religious 
differences, as well as from economic class, geography, 
and family-type differences. These are potential, 
significant influences in science education.  
 
 This leads us to three key questions, What are 
the presuppositions and attributes of a scientifically 
compatible world view? What presuppositions and 
attributes are scientifically neutral? What 
presuppositions and attributes actively hinder 
scientific understanding and science attitudes? The 
significance of the questions is that the answers have the 
potential to improve our understanding of what is and is 
not a science misconception, to improve our definitions 
of appropriate scientific attitudes and improve our 
attitude research approaches, to better inform locus of 
control studies, and to in general, provide a broader, 
more coherent framework for cognitive studies. 
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Obviously the answering of these questions would be a 
significant undertaking. At this point, as an example, I 
will only attempt a partial answer to the first question.  
 
 Collingwood's pathologist provides an example 
of a necessary first order presupposition in the 
Causality universal if a worldview is to be 
scientifically compatible. The presupposition is that all 
effects, E, have causes, C. This presupposition is 
modified by an interaction with a first order 
presupposition in the Classification universal, i.e., there 
are different classes of cause. The pathologist 
undoubtedly recognizes several classes and to these 
classes he will apply attributes such as usage. Because 
he is a pathologist we can be sure that of the various 
classes of cause he assumes always to exist, he 
considers some to be appropriate for science and others 
not. Eventually this avenue of reasoning leads to an 
informational level where the pathologist has stored 
knowledge of specific causes for specific effects, e.g., 
virus X causes disease. This is a much narrower, more 
defined level of epistemological structure than the level 
of universals at which we began. The work on 
meaningful learning by Novak (1977) and Ausubel 
(1963) concerns epistemological structures at this level 
of an individual's total mental framework. However, a 
scientifically compatible worldview does not require 
the lower, informational levels. It only requires that 
presuppositions and attributes be in place so that when 
specific information is confronted, such as the effects of 
viruses, the information will be meaningful.  
 
 While the above example speaks of science 
knowledge, it could as well have been science 
processes, or what is often called scientific thinking. 
Briefly, in the universal Causality our pathologist has a 
first order presupposition concerning ways of knowing. 
There will be an interaction with Classification and the 
result will be a category of knowing that is appropriate 
for science. In that category will be the knowledge that 
the scientific way of knowing involves observation, 
theory, experiment and so on. 
 
 As noted this has only been a partial response to 
the first key question. A complete set of answers will 
likely come through the study of the various models 
used in extant science education research on science 
attitudes and the nature of science. However, this 
research relies heavily on works in the philosophy of 
science. Worldview theory will require that researchers 
pay more attention to studies in the history and 
sociology of science as they seek to answer these 
questions.  
 
 Before leaving this section I need to say that the 
example of cause and effect may trouble some readers. 
Indeed the contention that cause-and-effect causality has 
disappeared from modern physics has gained a degree 
of popularity. This surely is a philosophically erroneous 
deduction from modern quantum mechanics. As 
Fermilab cosmologist John L. Dykla has recently 
written: 
 
 All modern science is predicated on the 
philosophical  assumption that its subject is 
comprehensible...Of course, the advent of 
quantum mechanics in the twentieth century has 
compelled reappraisal of the deterministic 
paradigm of earlier science. Still, the activities 
of physicists are grounded in a belief in the 
existence of objective laws that correlate our 
observations of natural phenomena and allow at 
least some limited measure of successful 
prediction (1989, p. 169). 
 
Even if we grant that in physics there has been a 
complete change in the understanding of causality, the 
rest of science still lives in a rather Newtonian 
universe. Furthermore, it is difficult to conceive of a 
science education program not based on a fairly 
traditional notion of causality. The banishment of 
Newtonian cause-and-effect causality would itself 
indicate a significant worldview shift in the general 
American populace.  
 
Application to Misconception Research 
The power of the logico-structural model of worldview 
lays in its research utility for the analysis and 
understanding of worldview variation not only where 
there is a prima facie  case for such variation, but also 
within what is usually considered a single worldview 
group. This is most easily seen in misconception 
research. In a typical misconception study the 
researcher might investigate students' understanding of 
the concept ecosystem by asking students why some 
organisms consume other organisms in a given pattern 
or sequence. Responses such as "It's God's purpose," 
and "Organisms eat other organisms to preserve their 
species," are considered misconceptions (Marek, 
1986). The researcher might then attempt to displace the 
misconceptions by employing Ausubelian cognitive 
bridges, i.e., the introduction of a lesson using 
statements intended to connect new material to what the 
students already know (Ausubel, Novak & Hanesian, 
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1978). Such attempts to make learning more meaningful 
do help, but to date research shows the effects to be 
limited. Based on worldview theory, one can argue that 
misconception is a more complicated phenomenon than 
previously considered, and that cognitive bridges as 
currently construed will never be completely effective.  
 
 Consider the above example of misconception 
research in which the researcher investigated students' 
understanding of the concept ecosystem by asking them 
why some organisms consume other organisms in a 
given pattern or sequence (Marek, 1986). Responses 
such as "It's God's purpose," and "Organisms eat other 
organisms to preserve their species," are considered 
misconceptions, but are they? A worldview analysis 
begins by assuming that the students' responses are 
meaningful to the students, if not to the teacher. The 
responses are indicative of epistemological 
presuppositions within the worldview universals 
NonSelf, Causality, and Classification. To clarify this 
consider Figure 7 which is adapted from Bube's 
structural diagram of the universe (1971). This is a 
convenient way of showing the NonSelf broken down 
into categories, or subdomains (all of which could be 
further subdivided). The first two columns contain 
parallel sets of categories, the first column showing 
more general terms and the second more specific. The 
third column shows a corresponding set of intellectual 
disciplines. The existence of a category in the NonSelf 
not only makes a particular discipline meaningful, but 
also the concepts of causality associated with that 
discipline. 
 
 The student who gives "God" as an explanation 
for a natural phenomenon does so because there exists 
important theological categories in the student's 
classification of the NonSelf (though this is not to imply 
that the student is a self-conscious theologian). We can 
also assume that the student's biological categories are 
relatively weaker. In contrast, biology instruction 
primarily involves the categories of cell, plant and 
animal. Some other categories in Figure 7 may also be 
involved on occasion, but certainly not theological 
categories; in other words, biology instruction is 
functionally atheistic. 
 
 Furthermore, the biology textbook and 
classroom teacher will employ a rather restricted 
definition of cause. They say that one can explain (i.e., 
give the cause) an event E when one knows that event E 
occurs only when the material conditions C occur, 
where the conditions C are a restricted set of categories 
within the NonSelf domain (Ross 1962, p. 64). Again, 
the instruction is functionally atheistic because the 
restricted set does not include theological categories 
(Kilbourn, 1974; Proper, Wideen & Ivany, 1988). 
 
 The student's use of God as an explanation is 
evidence of a significant disjunction between aspects of 
the student's worldview and that which is projected in 
the classroom. The categories of the NonSelf important 
to the student are the very ones deliberately shunned in 
the classroom. In Aristotelian terms, the student's 
interest is in final causes, not the efficient causes of 
biology instruction. This worldview analysis allows us 
to see that the student's response is not at all a 
misconception, but a meaningful response based on the 
student's epistemological framework. It also allows us 
to see the failure of the classroom instruction. 
Instruction has not helped the student articulate 
theological and biological categories in such a way that 
both become meaningful for the student. 
 
 Like the student above, the student who 
responds, "organisms eat other organisms to preserve 
their species" is showing an interest in theological or 
philosophical categories. It may be that unlike the first 
student, the second student knows that citing God as a 
causal agent is inappropriate in a science classroom. 
Nevertheless, lacking sufficient articulation between 
theological and biological categories, the student gives 
a meaningful, teleological response, not a biological 
one. On the other hand, there may be a nontheistic 
philosophical basis for this response. Further 
investigation would be required to make a 
determination. What we can conclude is that, our 
students may well learn from classroom instruction that 
big fish eat little fish, but their own worldviews 
provide the explanation. This example illustrates the 
immense difference between understanding and 
explanation (Strike, 1972). 
 
 Figure 8 summarizes the root analysis of a 
misconception. The term misconception as it is 
currently used actually collapses two distinct 
categories. The first category is the relatively simple 
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Figure 7. Categorizing the NonSelf 
(Adapted from Bube, 1971, p. 34) 
 
General Categories Specific Categories Intellectual Disciplines 
Ultimate God Theology & Philosophy 
Human 
Society 
 
Man/Woman 
Sociology 
 
Anthropology & 
Psychology 
Living but non human 
Animals 
 
Plants 
Zoology 
 
Botany 
Simple Life Cells Biology 
Material but non living 
Non living matter 
 Molecules 
 Atoms 
 Elementary Particles 
Physics & Chemistry 
Non material Energy Origins 
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case of uninformed naiveté, inadequate instruction or 
misinformation that leads to factual misunderstanding. In 
this category the student's worldview is not the issue. 
This is the general assumption in current misconception 
research. However, worldview theory points to a 
second category. A misconception can be an 
explanation logically deduced from an alternative 
worldview. Because this misconception has intuitive 
appeal for the student, assimilation of what is 
considered proper scientific understanding is hindered. 
Or, a student may have an alternative worldview that in 
principle is capable of assimilating scientific 
understanding, but does not esteem scientific 
explanations of physical reality. Thus, the student does 
not retain them. Third, though a student's alternative 
worldview might not actively hinder science 
understanding or interest, meaningful learning requires 
that the science concepts be linked to the student's 
worldview. The failure to establish such links results in 
the rejection or non-retention of the science concept. In 
the second category, the student's ideas are not properly 
called misconceptions, for they are logically grounded 
in the student's view of nature. They are alternative 
conceptions, only some of which are also science 
misconceptions. 
 
 The implications for instruction are significant. 
Novak (1977, pp. 25 and 26) states that "meaningful 
learning occurs when new information is linked with 
existing concepts" in the learner's cognitive structure. 
Advance organizers are intended to provide such links. 
However, the typical advance organizer is a product of 
a mechanical view of causality and a naturalistic view 
of the world, and thus would be of limited value for the 
above students. To be effective, an advance organizer 
must link instruction with appropriate presuppositions 
within a student's worldview. In this example the 
teacher would have to introduce a greater range of 
Classifications, discuss their relations, and the reasons 
for limiting them in the science classroom. In this 
example the goal is not to substitute classifications 
since there is no indication that the students' 
worldviews actively hinder science learning. The 
teacher's goal would be to enrich the students' 
worldviews by developing or refining worldview 
classifications.  
 
 The above scenario will have to be justified by 
research. It does have much that is appealing. From 
worldview theory we can infer detailed, testable 
explanations for the answers given by the students. We 
can infer explanations for the ineffective-ness of typical, 
science instructional strategies with these students. 
Finally, we can infer that deep cognitive bridges that 
reach back to the students' worldview presuppositions 
will be instructionally more effective. In sum, there is in 
worldview theory significant, potential explanatory 
power for misconception research generated data.  
 
Evidence for the Theory 
In contrast to the thematic approach to worldview, the 
sensitivity and richness of the logico-structural 
worldview model allows rational justification for the 
expectation of worldview variation in the typical school 
classroom. Of course this then raises the question of 
empirical evidence. And if the evidence is forthcoming 
the question then becomes, do these variations actually 
exert a significant influence on science achievement and 
attitude as predicted by the theory? 
 
 These questions require an instrument for 
detecting the hypothesized worldview variations. In 
another paper I have reported on the development of 
just such an instrument (Cobern, 1989). The approach 
involved focusing on the Causal universal and deducing 
that worldview variation implies that different types of 
causal explanation will be unequally acceptable among 
different students. The instrument, referred to as the Test 
of Preferred Explanations (TOPE), is a paper-and-pen 
instrument largely comprised of fictional episodes each 
followed by two explanations of different type. The 
explanations were classed either as more scientifically 
compatible or less scientifically compatible, where 
scientific compatibility was determined by philosophic 
analysis. Data collected among college freshmen 
showed considerable variation as predicted by the 
theory. Furthermore, students indicating no interest in 
science were more likely to choose the scientifically 
less compatible explanations than were the students 
with science interest. The students with science interest 
were in turn less likely to accept the more scientifically 
compatible explanations than were professional 
scientists. 
 
 The above evidence in support of the theory is 
compelling but by no means conclusive. Additional 
support can be inferentially derived from the 
constructivist epistemology of Novak (1982) and 
Gowin (1981). Ault et al. writes, 
 
several directions in recent science education 
research point to the importance of 
understanding the organization of content in 
cognitive structure...Novak (1982) interprets 
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research over the past several years at 
Cornell...to favor the view that assimilation of 
new knowledge is most closely related to the 
development of cognitive structure...(1984, p. 
443). 
Worldview is the foundation for cognitive structure as 
indicated by the position given to worldview in Figure 
1 (also see Figure 1 in Ault, Novak & Gowin, 1984, p. 
442). Therefore by extrapolation, the evidence noted by 
Ault et al. (1984) for the importance of cognitive 
structure in learning can be applied to worldview. 
Clearly this is circumstantial evidence, nevertheless this 
line of inference, the evidence provided by Kearney 
(1984), along with the work of Cobern (1989) provide 
a significant preliminary indication that the theory is not 
only sound, but investigatively fertile. 
 
A Research Agenda 
The first item on a research agenda has to be the 
continued pursuit of basic corroboration of the theory, 
specifically hypothesized relationships between 
worldview and science education. This may be 
approached by refining the TOPE study (Cobern, 1988, 
1989). TOPE is intended to be a preliminary 
discriminating device. If in future research it is used 
prior to more incisive investigative techniques such as 
techniques involving the Interview Vee (Ault, Novak & 
Gowin, 1988), one can expect improved results. 
 
  The content of TOPE is based on 
presuppositions in the Causal universal deemed 
necessary to scientific explanation. Research of greater 
breadth will require a more thorough defining of the 
parameters, i.e., the gross anatomy, of a scientifically 
compatible worldview. Researchers will have to 
identify the logico-structurally related presuppositions 
and attributes in all seven universals that are of 
importance to science in order to answer the questions: 
What does science require of students' fundamental 
belief and thought structures? What epistemological 
foundation must be in place in order for science to be 
meaningful? To be more specific, one might ask, what 
presuppositions and attributes concerning causality (or 
about time or space) should students have? This is a 
concept mapping type of problem except that one is 
working with much more fundamental epistemological 
structures. A fruitful approach may be to work with 
Collingwood's (1940) notion of absolute and relative 
presuppositions. 
 
 The current method in science education 
research for defining the nature of science, and this 
includes defining a scientific worldview, is to derive a 
definition from the philosophy of science. This was the 
approach in the TOPE study. However, determining the 
necessary and sufficient aspects of a scientifically 
compatible worldview is not a purely philosophical 
question about the nature of science. Instead of 
philosophical analysis, the researcher must inquire into 
worldview variation among scientists. There are 
successful scientists drawn from the ranks of women, 
African-Americans, Christians, and non-westerners as 
well as from white, male Americans. What do these 
people have in common that allows them to value and 
successfully participate in the scientific enterprize? It 
bears repeating that the goal is not to identify the 
definitive scientific worldview, but to determine the 
necessary and sufficient aspects of a scientifically 
compatible worldview. 
 
 Of course, defining the parameters of a 
scientifically compatible worldview returns us to the 
issue of lived versus articulated worldview and the 
confusion of the two concepts. In the existing education 
literature the usage of the term worldview suggests 
articulated worldview, but it is clear that the authors 
intend that their notions about science become part of 
students' and teachers' lived worldview. Unfortunately 
this often leads to the scientism that Duschl (1988) so 
appropriately denounces. A vital item then on any 
worldview research agenda must be the clarification of 
these terms and the relationship between the concepts 
involved. 
 
 Having in hand the parameters of a scientifically 
compatible worldview in logico-structural terms will 
allow researchers to address the problem of identifying 
a broad range of worldview variations vis-à-vis a 
scientifically compatible worldview. This likely will 
require innovative techniques such as the fictitious 
episodes used in TOPE items. The Dart and Pradham 
mapping technique has potential for use in studying 
presuppositions in the Space universal of students. 
These researchers, interested in readiness to understand 
and use scientific abstractions, compared maps showing 
home and school drawn by American and Nepalese 
students (Dart and Pradham, 1967; Dart, 1971; also see 
McCormack, 1988). Another technique with potential 
for wider use has students respond to illustrations. 
Osborne and Gilbert (1980) used this method to explore 
students’ basic understanding of force. A good source of 
potential techniques can be found in White (1979), 
which describes various methods for exploring students' 
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cognitive structures. Few of these methods and 
techniques were developed specifically for worldview 
investigations and none are based on the logico-
structural model; nevertheless, many can readily be 
adapted for this purpose.  
 
 Assuming students with worldview variations 
are identified, investigation can then turn to the effects 
of such variations on science achievement and attitude. 
Of particular interest will be the worldview analysis of 
socio-cultural groups such as women, African-
Americans, Asians and Hispanics vis-à-vis science 
education. Clearly the Belenky, Clincy, Goldberger and 
Tarule study Women's Ways of Knowing indicates the 
potential fruitfulness of an investigation of a feminine-
oriented worldview. I suspect that ultimately an 
analysis of scientifically compatible worldview 
variations will show that the worldview variations of 
groups such as women, African-Americans and 
Hispanics are not incompatible with science, only with 
the way science is often taught.  
 
 An underdeveloped area in science education 
research is the role of affect or emotion in science 
learning and attitude development. However, Novak has 
written recently that an 
 
emerging trend in the psychology of learning is 
greater emphasis on the role of feelings or 
emotion in learning, and the interplay between 
an individual's self-concept and choice of 
learning strategies and/or domains of science 
(1989). 
A researcher wishing to approach the issue of affect 
from a worldview perspective would be well advised 
to focus attention on the Self-Relationship-NonSelf 
structure. There is the potential that an investigation of 
this structure will lead to an understanding of the 
presuppositions about Self, about nature, and about 
one's relationship with nature that form the 
epistemological foundation for the emotions related to 
science achievement and attitude. Done in conjunction 
with gender issues this could be a very important line of 
inquiry. 
 
 A further way of seeking theory corroboration 
and to further articulate the theory is to reexamine extant 
misconception research in the light of logico-structural 
theory. Researchers should find a mixture of the classes 
shown in Figure 8, that is true misconceptions that 
involve no worldview variations as well as alternative 
conceptions derived from worldview variations. 
 
 It has been argued by Novak (1982) that the data 
resulting from a Piagetian research paradigm can better 
be explained by the constructivist epistemological 
paradigms of theorists such as David Ausubel. That may 
well be the case but it is also possible that some 
Piagetian research may profitably be redirected by 
constructivist theory such as that presented here. Susan 
Buck-Morss has noted that while Piaget rejected 
ideologies of biological racism, a universal application 
of Piaget's developmental theory, 
 
cannot account for the frequent chronological 
`lag' in test performance of non-Western 
samples and the fact that members of some 
cultures never `reach' certain levels of logical 
operations (1975, p. 261) 
and thus there is a racist implication. Perhaps placing 
developmental theory within the framework of 
worldview theory would circumvent this difficulty. 
 
 At some point it must be asked, what does all 
this mean for classroom instruction, if anything at all? Is 
it possible, and if so is it feasible, to develop effective 
worldview-informed, instructional strategies and 
materials? Already some writers have implied that 
science education should be used to influence students' 
worldviews (e.g., Proper, Wideen & Ivany, 1988). The 
logico-structural theory of worldview implies that in the 
short time span of a typical classroom setting attempts at 
influencing student worldviews are not likely to be 
successful. Indeed, we already know that the classroom 
setting does not appreciably influence student views on 
the nature of science (e.g., see Lederman, 1986; 
Lederman & Zeidler, 1986), which should be an easier 
task than influencing world view. What we can predict 
now is that influence is only likely to be achieved over 
a long period of time; and that influence aimed at 
enhancing or further articulating students' worldviews is 
more likely to be successful than attempts at overt 
change.  
 
 In summary, the science education researcher 
interested in worldview theory must first be able to 
describe a scientifically compatible worldview (at least 
in part), and then be able to distinguish between 
students with and without such a worldview. Only then 
can one address the question of worldview variation as 
a factor in science achievement and attitude. The 
specific research questions I have posed in this 
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concluding agenda and elsewhere in the paper are only 
a beginning. Ultimately the value of worldview theory 
as a research framework in science education rests on 
its integrating effectiveness and on the fruitfulness of the 
research directed by fundamental questions generated 
by the theory. 
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